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ONE PERSON, ONE WEIGHTED VOTE

Ashira Pelman Ostrow*
Abstract
This Article argues that weighted voting should be used to comply
with the constitutional one-person, one-vote requirement while
preserving representation for political units on the legislative body. First,
this Article demonstrates that weighted voting satisfies the quantitative
one-person, one-vote requirement by equalizing the mathematic weight
of each vote. Second, this Article demonstrates that weighted voting has
the potential to remedy several negative consequences of equalpopulation districts. Specifically, this Article argues that by preserving
local political boundaries, weighted voting eliminates the decennial
redistricting process that gives rise to claims of partisan gerrymandering,
enables local governments to function both as administrative arms of the
state and as independent political communities and provides a format for
regional governance. Third, this Article recognizes that while weightedvoting equalizes the mathematic weight of each vote, it does not equalize
all aspects of legislative representation. In particular, this Article explains
that weighted-voting generates inequality in the functional representation
each voter receives, inflates the political power and voting power of
legislators from more populous districts, and increases the risk of
minority vote dilution. Though the Supreme Court has never addressed
the constitutionality of weighted voting, this Article argues that weighted
voting does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Instead, this Article
maintains that the Equal Protection Clause does not require equal
functional representation or legislator power, and that the Supreme Court
permits the use of at-large voting systems that have a similar capacity to
dilute minority voice. Thus, this Article concludes that while it is
important to recognize the tradeoffs inherent in weighted-voting
apportionment plans, these tradeoffs do not preclude their use.
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INTRODUCTION

Every ten years, jurisdictions throughout the country comply with the
constitutional one-person, one-vote mandate by redrawing their
legislative maps to equalize the population of each district.' In the quest
for population equality, local governments are broken into abstract
electoral districts, destabilizing political communities and affording
politicians nearly limitless discretion to gerrymander electoral boundaries
1. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016) (noting that the one-person, one-vote
doctrine requires states to "regularly reapportion districts to prevent malapportionment"). For an
overview of the redistricting process, see NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
REDISTRICTING LAW 2010 (2009).
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for their own personal and political ends. While other jurisdictions
engage in contentious political and legal battles over district lines,2
Delaware County, in upstate New York, simply adjusts the number of
votes allocated to each member of its Board of Supervisors.3 That is
because Delaware County is among a handful of counties that uses a
unique system of weighted voting.4 Under this system, each town elects
a representative whose vote is weighted in proportion to that town's share
of the county population.5 Thus, a representative whose town contains ten
percent of the total county population is allocated ten percent of the votes
in the county legislature.
This Article argues that weighted voting should be used to preserve
representation for political subdivisions and prevent gerrymandering.
Though the concept is not new, weighted voting has been surprisingly
underexplored and, as this Article argues, underutilized. 6 In its oneperson, one-vote cases, the U. S. Supreme Court insisted that each vote
be weighted equally with all other votes cast in the same election.' It did
2. For an overview of litigation following each decennial census, see Justin Levitt,
Litigation in the 2010 Cycle, ALL ABOUT REDISTRICTING, http://redistricting.l1s.edulcases.php

(last visited June 18, 2016).
3. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996).
&

4. See Gerald Benjamin, At-Large Elections in N. Y.S. Cities, Towns, Villages, and School
Districts and the Challenge of Growing PopulationDiversity, 5 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 733, 742
n.49 (2012) (listing counties that use weighted voting); N.Y. STATE Ass'N CTYS., COUNTY
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION IN NEW YORK STATE 14 (2015) (providing overview of county
structure).
5. See Roxbury Taxpayers All., 80 F.3d at 49.
6. The only recent works of scholarship addressing weighted voting as a means of
complying with the one-person, one-vote requirement are Keith R. Wesolowski, Note, Remedy
Gone Awry: Weighing in on Weighted Voting, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1883, 1884 (2003) (case
study on a New York court ordering a county to adopt a weighted-voting scheme) and Jurij
Toplak, Equal Voting Weight ofAll: Finally "One Person, One Vote "from Hawaii to Maine?,

81 TEMP. L. REv. 123, 145-46 (2008) (arguing for weighted voting in Congress). For earlier
commentary, see Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local

Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 401 (1993) (considering a weighted-voting alternative for
regional governance); Richard David Emery, Weighted Voting, 6 TOURO L. REv. 159, 160-61
(1989) (arguing that weighted voting is unconstitutional); Bernard Grofman & Howard Scarrow,
Weighted Voting in New York, 6 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 287, 287 (1981) (describing flaws in weighted
voting); Ronald E. Johnson, An Analysis of Weighted Voting as Used in Reapportionment of
County Governments in New York State, 34 ALB. L. REv. 1, 44-45 (1969) (scrutinizing the
computer-testing technique for the validation of weighted-voting plans in New York). Several
international bodies, including the European Union, the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, use weighted-voting systems. William N. Gianaris, Weighted Voting in the
InternationalMonetary Fund and the World Bank, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 910, 910 (1991); Eric
A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Voting Rules in InternationalOrganizations, 15 CH. J. INT'L L. 195,
197 (2014); LASZLO A. KOCzy, THE EFFECT OF BREXIT ON VOTING IN THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (2016), http://www.academia.edu/26845750/.

7. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964) (requiring equally weighted votes in
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not insist that state and local districts be equally sized.8 Instead, in
Reynolds v. Sims,9 the Court held that a plan in which representatives of
disparately sized districts each had a single vote in the legislative body
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 0
The problem was not that the districts themselves were unequal but rather
that they received unequal representation." Thus, the Reynolds Court
itself maintained that a state might be able to compensate for population
disparities by increasing the legislative representation of more populous
districts.

12

Weighted voting satisfies the one-person, one-vote requirement by
increasing the number of legislative votes each representative casts in
proportion to the district's population.1 3 To illustrate, assume an averagesized district has 1,000 residents. Each district would elect a single
representative with one vote in the legislature. Residents of a weighted
district with 2,000 residents would elect a single representative who
would cast two votes. In each district, the ratio of residents to legislative
votes is 1,000 to 1. Although the populations vary, the numeric weight of
each vote is exactly the same. This avoids the Reynolds problem in which
disparately sized districts are granted the same legislative representation.
Weighted voting, thus, enables legislatures to use political
subdivisions that vary in size as electoral districts. Following Reynolds v.
Sims, several states considered adopting weighted-voting apportionment
plans to equalize representation for their existing districts.1 4 Proponents
congressional districts); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964) (requiring equally weighted
votes in state legislative districts); Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474,480-81 (1968) (requiring
equally weighted votes in general purpose municipal legislatures).
8. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1965) (holding that state plan that mixed
single-member and multimember districts that varied in size did not deny residents an equally

weighted vote); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 327-28 (1973) (finding that multimember
apportionment plan satisfied the one-person, one-vote requirement even though the districts

varied in population size); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 147 (1971) (stating that unequal
multimember districts satisfy the one-person, one-vote requirement).

9.
10.
11.
12.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 565-66.
Id. at 567.
Id. at 549, 577 (noting that in state legislatures "[o]ne body could be composed of

single-member districts while the other could have at least some multimember districts"); see also
Fortson, 379 U.S. at 436 (noting that Reynolds "rejected the notion that equal protection

necessarily requires the formation of single-member districts").
13. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996);
R. Alta Charo, Designing MathematicalModels to Describe One-Person, One- Vote Compliance
by Unique Governmental Structures: The Case of the New York City Board of Estimate, 53

FORHAM L. REV. 735, 777 (1985).
14. John F. Banzhaf III, Weighted Voting Doesn't Work: A Mathematical Analysis, 19

RUTGERS L. REV. 317, 317 (1965) ("[W]eighted voting has been widely suggested as an
alternative to actual reapportionment.").
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argued that weighted voting would prevent gerrymandering and enable
states to continue to use counties as the unit of representation in the state
legislature.1 5 Critics countered that weighted voting generates inequality
in critical dimensions of legislative representation. 16 Courts, for the most
part, sided with critics and rejected state-wide weighted-voting plans for
failing to equalize the non-voting aspects of legislative representation.17
Thus, most jurisdictions elect representatives from single-member,
equal-population districts.1 8 The Supreme Court has expressed a strong
preference for this mode of apportionment.' 9 Federal law requires equalpopulation districts for congressional seats, 20 and the vast majority of
states use equal-population districts for their state legislatures. 2 1 Over the
past decades, however, it has become increasingly obvious that equalpopulation districting imposes its own costs on voter equality. 22 Equalpopulation districts inevitably disrupt the integrity of local government
boundaries. The decennial redistricting process exacerbates this effect,
inhibiting the formation of political communities and enabling
gerrymandering.
15. Id. at 323; Robert Imrie, The Impact of the Weighted Vote on Representation in
Municipal Governing Bodies ofNew York State, 219 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sc. 192, 199 (1973)
(advocating the use of weighted voting as a temporary solution).
16. Banzhaf, supra note 14, at 318 (arguing that weighted voting overrepresents residents
of more populous districts); Jack B. Weinstein, The Effect of the Federal Reapportionment
Decisions on Counties and Other Forms of Municipal Government, 65 CoLuM. L. REv. 21, 45-

46 (1965) (arguing that weighted voting does not provide equal legislative representation).
17. See infra notes 152-60.
18. James A. Gardner, What Is "Fair" Partisan Representation, and How Can It Be
Constitutionalized? The Casefor A Return to Fixed Election Districts, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 555,
562 (2007) (noting our country's "commitment on both the federal and state levels to the use of
single-member, territorial election districts"); Jeffrey C. O'Neill, Everything That Can Be
CountedDoes Not Necessarily Count: The Right to Vote and the Choice ofa Voting System, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REv. 327, 332 ("Single-member districts are the norm in the United States and
engender the two-party system.").

19. See Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 19 (1975); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692
(1971).
20. 2 U.S.C. § 2a(a), (c) (2012) (requiring single-member equal population districts for
congressional representatives).
21. See O'Neill, supra note 18, at 332; Gardner, supra note 18, at 562; Nicholas 0.
Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the TerritorialCommunity, 160 U. PA. L. REv. 1379, 1406

(2012).
22. Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, Redistricting Principlesfor the Twenty-First

Century, 62 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1179, 1185 (2012) (describing oddly shaped equal-population
districts drawn to favor a political party, incumbent, or minority group); Pamela S. Karlan, Maps
and Misreading: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 176 (1989) (noting that the equal-population requirement does not
prevent legislators from gerrymandering district boundaries to dilute the voting power of minority
groups); Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal Standardfor Imposing Alternative Electoral
Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33 HARv. C.R.-CL. L. REv. 333,339 (1998) ("Single-member
districting ... provides members of governing bodies substantial discretion to 'gerrymander' in

such a way as to determine the outcome of elections.").
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This Article argues that weighted voting should be used to mitigate
these costs. The Article proceeds as follows. Part I argues that weightedvoting systems satisfy the constitutional one-person, one-vote
requirement by allocating legislative votes in proportion to the population
of each district. Moreover, this Part argues the Supreme Court's default
preference for single-member, equal-population districting can be
overcome by a desire to preserve the boundaries of political subdivisions.
Part II considers the advantages of weighted voting. Specifically, Part
1I argues that by preserving local political boundaries, weighted voting
eliminates the decennial redistricting process that gives rise to claims of
partisan gerrymandering, enables local governments to function both as
administrative arms of the state and as independent political
communities, and provides a format for regional governance.
Part III recognizes that weighted-voting does not equalize all aspects
of legislative representation. In particular, weighted-voting systems
generate inequality in the functional representation each voter receives,
inflate the political power and voting power of legislators from more
populous districts, and increase the risk of minority vote dilution. Though
these inequalities are critically important from a policy perspective, this
Part argues that they do not render weighted voting unconstitutional per
se.
Part IV proposes combining weighted-voting with equal-population
districts to form districts that correspond to political subdivisions, yet
contain roughly the same number of people. Combining weighted voting
with equal-population districts maximizes the advantages of each
apportionment format. First, using existing political subdivisions as
electoral districts prevents gerrymandering, strengthens the role of local
governments and removes an obstacle to regional governance. Second,
equalizing the population of each district equalizes functional
representation and legislator power, and prevents minority vote dilution.
Finally, allocating votes to each district in proportion to its population
equalizes the mathematical weight of each vote and satisfies the
quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement. Hybrid weighted-voting
plans, thus, harmonize multiple districting goals that would otherwise
conflict.

I.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF WEIGHTED VOTING

Historically, electoral districts corresponded to fixed political units,
such as counties or cities. 23 Until the 1960s, the most common mode of
apportionment was to create districts comprised of one or more whole
23. James A. Gardner, One Person, One Vote and the Possibility ofPoliticalCommunity,
80 N.C. L. REV. 1237, 1244-45 (2002); Stephanopoulos, supra note 21, at 1406.
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counties and vary the number of representatives elected from each district
in rough proportion to their respective populations. 2 4 In its
reapportionment cases, the Supreme Court firmly rejected the use of local
governments as the units of representation on legislative bodies. 2 5 In
Reynolds v. Sims,26 the Court required state legislatures to be apportioned
according to population, without regard to the state's existing political
subdivisions. 27 As the Reynolds Court famously held, "Legislators
represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not
farms or cities."28
One-person, one-vote triggered a reapportionment revolution. Most
jurisdictions complied with the one-person, one-vote mandate by
transitioning to equal-population districting. 29 These newly formed
districts nearly always disrupted the boundaries of existing political
communities, such as counties, towns, and cities. 30 Weighted voting
emerged in the midst of this upheaval, as a compromise, designed to
preserve representation for existing political subdivisions, while
providing each voter with an equally weighted vote.
This Part argues that weighted-voting systems satisfy the one-person,
one-vote requirement. Section A argues that weighted voting equalizes
the weight of each vote by allocating legislative votes in proportion to
population. Section B argues that the Court's preference for singlemember, equal-population districts can be overcome by a competing
desire to preserve representation for existing political subdivisions.
24. Stephanopoulos, supra note 21, at 1387-88.
25. Bruce E. Cain, Election Law as a Field: A PoliticalScientist's Perspective, 32 Loy.
L.A. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1999) (noting that in its one-person, one-vote cases the Court endorsed
a population-based theory of representation); Gardner, supra note 23, at 1238 (noting that "the
Court not only formally rejected, but also decisively delegitimized, the new doctrine's logical and
historical alternative: one community, one vote"); Karlan, supra note 22, at 174 ("Reynolds
represented a decisive rejection of a conception of representation that allocated the opportunity to
exercise effective political power on the basis of geography.").

26. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
27. Id. at 568.
28. Id. at 562.
29. Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform Since
Baker

v.

Carr,

in

PARTY

LINES:

COMPETITION,

PARTISANSHIP,

AND

CONGRESSIONAL

REDISTRICTING 8-10 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005).
30. See Cain et al., supra note 29, at 8 ("The equal population criterion inevitably wreaked
havoc on geographic representation since in many instances homogeneous communities of
interest had to be split or combined in order to achieve population equality among districts.");
Cain, supra note 25, at 1107-08 (describing the one-person, one-vote requirement's disruptive

effect on geographic districting); Gardner, supra note 23, at 1257 (noting that "recognized local
political communities" were broken up "because their populations fail to add up to the required
numbers"); Stephanopoulos, supra note 21, at 1412 (describing disruption of local government
boundaries following the one-person, one-vote requirement).
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Section C briefly surveys the case law, noting that both New York's
highest court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit have
held that weighted voting satisfies the one-person, one-vote requirement.
A. Equalizing the Weight of a Vote
The constitutional one-person, one-vote doctrine requires that
legislatures be apportioned on a population basis so that each person has
a mathematically equally weighted vote. 3 1 As Professor Pamela Karlan
explains, the one-person, one-vote cases are 'based solely on a
mathematical analysis' that shows that the votes of persons in one district
are devalued relative to the votes of persons in a less-populated district." 3 2

This Section argues that weighted-voting plans, like multimember plans,
satisfy the one-person, one-vote requirement so long as (1) votes in the
legislative body are allocated in proportion to population, and (2) the
maximum deviation from population equality is within a constitutionally
permissible range.
1. Proportional Representation
Though the Court has expressed a strong preference for singlemember, equal-population districts, 33 they are not strictly required. To the
contrary, in 1965, in Fortson v. Dorsey,34 the Supreme Court expressly
held that the one-person, one-vote requirement does not require the
formation of equal-population districts. 35 In Fortson,the Supreme Court
upheld a redistricting plan that consisted of a mixture of multimember
and single-member districts. 36 The Court determined that there is "clearly
no mathematical disparity" in the weight of each vote because each
district elects a number of representatives in proportion to its
population.3 7 In 1971, in Whitcomb v. Chavez,3 8 the Supreme Court again
held that multimember districts in which representatives were allocated
in proportion to population satisfied the mathematical one-person, onevote requirement.3 9
Both multimember districts and weighted-voting districts equalize the
weight of an individual vote by increasing the number of legislative votes
31. Karlan, supra note 22, at 176.

32. Id.
33. See, e.g., Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971) ("[S]ingle-member districts are
preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter.").

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

379 U.S. 433 (1965).
Id. at 438-39.
Id.
Id. at 437.
403 U.S. 124 (1971).
Id. at 145-46.
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in proportion to the district's population. Multimember districts equalize

the weight of individual votes by increasing each district's number of
representatives-and therefore the number of legislative votes-in
proportion to its population. Weighted-voting districts equalize the
weight of individual votes by increasing the number of legislative votes
each representative casts in proportion to the district's population.
To illustrate, assume an average-sized district has 1,000 residents.
Residents of a single-member, equal-population district would elect a
single representative with a single vote in the legislative body. Residents
of a multimember district with 2,000 residents would elect two
representatives, each of whom would then have a single vote in the
legislative body. Residents of a weighted-voting district with 2,000
residents would elect a single representative who would cast two votes.
In each district, the ratio of residents to legislative votes is 1,000 to 1.
Although the populations vary, the numeric weight of each vote is exactly
the same.
2. Deviation from Population Equality
Courts typically determine whether an apportionment plan complies
with the one-person, one-vote requirement by calculating the plan's
maximum deviation from population equality. 40 The maximum deviation
is the range by which the most overrepresented constituency differs from
the most underrepresented.4 1 If the largest district is two percent larger
than the ideal, and the smallest district is one percent smaller than the
ideal, then the overall range, or maximum population deviation, is three
percent.
The Court applies different standards to congressional districts versus
state and local plans. 4 2 At the national level, the Court insists on strict
equality, requiring that congressional districts be "as nearly equal in
population . .. as practicable." 4 3 In state and local apportionment plans,
40. .Karlan, supra note 22, at 176.
41. Courts refer to this range in a variety of ways. See, e.g., Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S.

74, 98-99 (1997) ("overall population deviation"); Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 700
(1989) ("maximum percentage deviation"); Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 417 (1977)
("maximum deviation"); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 23 (1975) ("deviation," "variation," and
"total population variance").
42. See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1149 (noting that the Court insists on strict
equality in congressional districts, but affords greater flexibility to state and local districts);

Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 322 (1973) (noting while "population alone has been the sole
criterion of constitutionality in congressional redistricting ... broader latitude has been afforded
the States under the Equal Protection Clause in state legislative redistricting").

43. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-97 (1973) (invalidating districts that were not as
mathematically equal as possible); see Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 734 (1983) (rejecting
New Jersey congressional reapportionment with less than one-percent deviation from population
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however, the Court has adopted a more flexible approach, generally
permitting state and local districts to deviate up to ten percent from the
ideal size. 4 4
In weighted-voting schemes, courts calculate the maximum deviation
using a weighted-vote formula that compares the percent of population
an official represents to the percent of votes allocated to that official. 4 5
Because votes are allocated in proportion to population, weighted-voting
plans generally do not deviate from population equality. If an official
whose town contains ten percent of the population is allocated ten percent
of the votes, the maximum deviation is zero percent. Weighted voting
plans, thus, produce precise mathematical equality.
B. DistrictingaroundPoliticalSubdivisions
In its reapportionment cases, the Supreme Court rejected using
political subdivisions as the sole unit of representation on legislative
bodies.4 6 The Court did not, however, negate the importance of political
subdivisions more generally. Indeed, the Reynolds Court itself
recognized the preservation of political subdivisions as a legitimate factor
in state districting, though it could not justify the enormous population
disparity in that case.4 7 In the words of the Court, "a State can rationally
consider
according political
subdivisions
some
independent
representation in at least one body of the state legislature, as long as the
basic standard of equality of population among districts is maintained."
Last term, in Evenwel v. Abbott, the Court confirmed that state and
local legislative districts are permitted to deviate to "accommodate
traditional districting objectives," such as "preserving the integrity of
equality); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531-32 (1969) (rejecting plan with six-percent
population deviation and rejecting the suggestion that there is a point at which population
differences among districts become de minimis); State ex rel. Stephan v. Graves, 796 F. Supp.
468, 470, 473 (D. Kan. 1992) (ruling that plan with a "maximum population deviation" of .94%
was unconstitutional regardless of the fact that the plan maintained whole counties in each

congressional district).
44. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 161 (1993) (noting ten-percent threshold);
Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) ("[The Court's] decisions have established, as a
general matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under ten

percent falls within this category of minor deviations."). But see Larois v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d
1320, 1340 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (finding that ten-percent threshold is presumptively constitutional
but not immune from constitutional attack), af'dmem., 542 U.S. 947 (2004).
45. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citing League of Women Voters v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 737 F.2d 155, 170 (2d Cir.
1984)) (comparing the "percent of total population represented by a given local official to the

percent of weighted votes allocated to that official").
46. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
47. Id. at 580-81.
48. Id. at 580.
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political subdivisions. 4 9 Thus, the Court regularly tolerates deviations
from population equality when adequately justified by a state policy
preserving the boundaries of existing political subdivisions, such as
counties, towns, or cities.o In the 1971 case of Abate v. Mundt,' for
example, the Court approved of a multimember apportionment plan for
Rockland County, New York, which had been drawn so its electoral
districts corresponded precisely with the county's five existing towns. 52
The Court upheld the plan despite its 11.9% deviation, explaining that
local needs "may sometimes justify departures from strict equality" and
that the "exact [town-district] correspondence" was desirable because it
facilitated interlocal cooperation. 5 3
In addition to recognizing the value of preserving towns on the county
legislature, the Court has recognized the value of preserving counties on
the state legislature. In 1973, in Mahan v. Howell,54 for example, the
Court endorsed a Virginia district plan with a 16.4% total deviation that
had been carefully drawn to avoid crossing city or county boundaries.5
The Court agreed that dividing counties into multiple districts would
harm county voters. In particular, the Court noted that if counties were
split, "[t]he opportunity of [their] voters to champion local legislation
[would be] virtually nil," and their "representation [would be] no
representation at all so far as local legislation is concerned." 5 6 Thus, the
Court determined that the state's policy of preserving local government
boundaries justified the deviation. 5 7
Ten years later, in Brown v. Thomson,58 the Court approved of a
Wyoming apportionment plan with an eighty-nine-percent maximum
deviation from population equality.' 9 The Court held that the state's
policy of using counties as representative districts and allocating at least
one representative to each county was supported by substantial and
49. 136 S.Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016).
50. Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 841 n.5, 847; Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,32425, 334 (1973) (upholding plan with 16.4% total deviation the Virginia General Assembly had
carefully drawn to avoid crossing city or county boundaries).
51. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
52. Id. at 184-86.
53. Id. at 185, 187; see also NANCY MAVEETY, REPRESENTATION RIGHTS AND THE BURGER

YEARS 46 (1991) (describing Abate as "the first Burger decision that is clearly consistent with the
conceptualization of territorial representation"); Dean Alfange, Jr., Gerrymandering and the
Constitution:Into the Thorns ofthe Thicket at Last, 1986 SUP. CT. REv. 175, 198 (noting that with
Abate "the Court began a retreat from the extreme rigidity of its 1969 position").

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

410 U.S. 315 (1973).
Id. at 324-25, 334.
Id. at 324-25.
See id
462 U.S. 835 (1983).
See id. at 846.
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legitimate state concerns. Specifically, the Court recognized that the
various counties had "different and distinctive" needs and were the
primary administrative agencies of the state government. 60 In 1994, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio similarly upheld an
Ohio legislative-district plan with a total deviation of 13.8 1%, for House
districts, that was a result of a rational state policy preserving county
lines.61
At the same time, the Court has rejected deviations that exceed ten
percent that were not adequately supported by state policies preserving
political boundaries. In Chapman v. Meir,62 for example, the Court struck
down an apportionment plan with a 20.14% deviation, noting that "[i]t is
far from apparent that North Dakota policy currently requires or favors
strict adherence to political lines." 63 Similarly, in Kilgarlin v. Hill,6 4 the
Court rejected a county-based apportionment plan where the state did not
demonstrate "why or how respect for the integrity of county lines
required the particular deviations." 65
C. Weighted- Voting Jurisprudence
Despite its preference for equal-population districts, the Court
regularly permits state and local apportionment plans to deviate from
population equality in order to accommodate the boundaries of political
subdivisions. In Abate v. Mundt,66 the Supreme Court recognized that
political subdivisions play an important role in the structure of New York
counties. Until the 1960s, New York counties were governed by a Board
of Supervisors composed of a single representative from each town
within the county. 67 The Court's holding in Reynolds v. SimS 6 8 and Avery
v. Midland County6 9 rendered New York's traditional "one-town, onevote" legislative structure unconstitutional. Roughly half of the counties
in New York responded to these rulings by replacing their county Boards
with county legislatures composed of single-member, equal-population

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 841 n.5.
Quilter v. Voinovich, 857 F. Supp. 579, 583, 586-87 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
420 U.S. 1 (1975).
Id. at 25.
386 U.S. 120 (1967).

65. Id. at 121, 124 (striking down a Texas statute using single-member, multimember, and

floterial districts that created a maximum population deviation of 26.48% as an "unconstitutional
'crazy quilt').
66. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
67. See N.Y. STATE Ass'N CTYS., supra note 4, at 14. For an overview of the structure of
New York counties, see id. at 4.

68. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
69. 390 U.S. 474, 476 (1968).
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districts. 70 The other half, however, adopted weighted-voting systems to
preserve the town-based structure of their county Boards.7 1 More than a
dozen counties continue to use weighted voting.72
Under traditional weighted-voting plans, the registered voters in each
town elect one town supervisor, who represents the town on the county
Board of Supervisors. 73 Each town supervisor casts a number of votes
based upon the town's population. 74 Thus, a representative whose town
contains twenty percent of the county population would cast twenty
percent of votes on the County Board. Other counties increase
representation for more densely populated areas by subdividing cities into
wards, each of which elects its own representative, 75 or by increasing the

70. Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 6, at 288-89.
71. Charo, supra note 13, at 784; see also Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 6, at 288-89
(noting three factors that led N.Y. counties to adopt weighted voting, including the history of
weighted voting in Nassau County, a commission report recommending weighted voting for the
state legislature and the nature of county politics in New York); Emery, supra note 6, at 161
(noting that New York adopted weighted voting to enable town mayors to continue to serve as
county legislators).
72. See supranote 4 and accompanying text; see also N.Y. STATE Ass'N CTYS., supra note
4, at 9-10. Counties that preserved their Boards generally do not have an elected executive.
Instead, an appointed county manager or the Board itself manages these counties. Id. Without
ruling out the possibility that others exist, the Author could only find one jurisdiction outside of
New York that, until recently, used weighted voting. In 2013, Barnstable County, Massachusetts,
voted to replace its weighted-voting system with a single-member, equal-population legislature.
See Recommendation of the Charter Review Committee, BARNSTABLE CTY. (Nov. 13, 2013),
http://www.barnstablecounty.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/12-4-13-Meeting-Packet.pdf.

73. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 244
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) (describing Delaware's weighted-voting plan following the 1990 census), aff'd,
80 F.3d 42, 43 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Schoharie Cty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 975 F. Supp. 191, 192 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (describing Schoharie County's weightedvoting plan), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998); lannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty.,
229 N.E.2d 195, 196 n.l (N.Y. 1967) (noting that supervisors on the Board had one vote despite
vast population differences between towns).
74. See, e.g., lannucci, 229 N.E.2d at 195. For an illustration, see MONTGOMERY CTY., N.Y.,
POPULATION AND WEIGHTED VOTE 2010 (2012), https://www.co.montgomery.ny.us/sites/public/
government/planning/charter/Charter Forms/ReferenceMaterials/Legislative Districts/Mont/o

20Co/o2OWeighted%2OVote/`2OMap.pdf (last visited June 7, 2016); Heather Nellis, Voting
Math Will Undergo Slight Chance, AMSTERDAM RECORDER, Apr. 18, 2011, at Al (describing
allocation of votes in Montgomery County). In 2012, Montgomery County replaced its weighted
voting system with a legislature consisting of nine members elected from equal-population
districts. See MONTGOMERY CTY. CHARTER art. 2, § 2.01 (2012); see also MONTGOMERY CTY.,
LocAL LAW FILING (2012), https://www.co.montgomery.ny.us/sites/public/govermnent/locallaws

/LocalLawScans/023.pdf (compiling documents relating to Local Law # 2).
75. Cortland County subdivides its densely populated city and suburban towns into
electoral districts. Cortland Cty., Legislative and Election Districts (2013); see Slater v. Bd. of

Supervisors of Cortland, 330 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948-50 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (upholding Cortland
County's apportionment plan), af'd, 346 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1973).
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number of representatives each district elects in proportion to the
district's population.7 6
Both the Second Circuit and the N.Y. Court of Appeals have held that
weighted voting satisfies the one-person, one-vote requirement.
In
1973, in Franklin v. Krause,7 8 the N.Y. Court of Appeals upheld Nassau
County's weighted-voting scheme against an Equal Protection
challenge. 7 9 In upholding the plan, which used towns as electoral
districts, the Franklin court emphasized the Supreme Court's tolerance
for flexible local governance structures and the value of preserving
representation for political subunits-towns and cities-on the County
Board.8 0 Thereafter, the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal of the New
York decision for want of a federal question.8 1 Subsequent cases have
treated this dismissal as a decision on the merits. 8 2 In other words, by
dismissing the appeal for want of a federal question, the Supreme Court
effectively determined that weighted voting at the local level does not
violate the federal constitution but is instead a matter of state law.83
More recently, in Roxbury Taxpayers Alliance v. Delaware County
Board of Supervisors,8 4 the Second Circuit upheld Delaware County's
weighted-voting plan under which each town elected a single
representative to the County Board.8 ' The court rejected the claim that
the Equal Protection Clause requires single-member, equal-population
districts and held that weighted voting satisfies the one-person, one-vote

76. Schenectady County increases the number of members each district elects in proportion
to the district's population and then divides the total number of votes between the district's
members. SCHENECTADY CTY., N.Y., CHARTER art. II, § 2.04(F) (2015); see Michael Lamendola,
Schenectady County Legislature Pushesfor Weighted Voting, DAILY GAZETTE (Apr. 12, 2011),

https://dailygazette.com/article/2011/04/12/0412 weighted.
77. See, e.g., Reform ofSchoharie Cry., 975 F. Supp. at 194-95; Roxbury Taxpayers All.,

80 F.3d at 49; Franklin v. Krause, 298 N.E.2d 68, 69 (N.Y. 1973); lannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors,
229 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1967); Slater, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
78. 298 N.E.2d 68 (N.Y. 1973).
79. Id. at 73.
80. See id. at 70, 73 (noting that preserving town boundaries facilitates local taxing and the
delivery of local services and that merging these units into equal-population districts "would be
to sacrifice practicality for an abstraction").
81. Franklin v. Krause, 415 U.S. 904 (1974).
82. See Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. Of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 244, 24748 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
83. See id. (noting that "[tihis type of dismissal is deemed to reach the merits of the case,
and creates binding precedent").

84. 80 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1996).
85. Id. at 49; see also Reform of Schoharie Cty. v. Schoharie Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 975
F. Supp. 191, 194-95 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding a substantially identical weighted-voting
scheme in Schoharie County).
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86
requirement so long as votes are allocated in proportion to population.
As the court explained, "[b]y having each town elect a representative, the
County assures that the interests of every town, no matter how small, are
considered by the Board, and that no town suffers from permanent lack
of representation on account of its size." 87 The Second Circuit reaffirmed
this holding two years later in Reform of Schoharie County v. Schoharie
County Board of Supervisors.8 8 In Schoharie County, the court upheld a
weighted-voting scheme which used towns as electoral districts and gave
each supervisor "a number of votes roughly proportionate to his or her
town's percentage share of the total population of the County." 89
In addition, the federal courts have twice ordered counties to adopt
weighted-voting schemes to remedy malapportioned districts. In 1997,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ordered
Rockland County to remedy its malapportioned districts by redistricting
or by adopting weighted voting. 90 Similarly, in 2001, after numerous
failed attempts to adopt a districting plan, the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York ordered Erie County to maintain its
existing 1990 districts and use weighted voting to comply with the oneperson, one-vote requirement.91 With nearly a century of use, countywide
weighted voting is firmly entrenched in New York as an apportionment
mechanism that enables counties to preserve representation for political
subdivisions in their legislative bodies.

II.

WEIGHTED VOTING AND POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

The constitutional principle of "one-person, one-vote" requires that
legislatures be apportioned on a population-basis. The primary means of
complying with the one-person, one-vote requirement is to elect
representatives to a legislative body from districts of equal population.
Drawing single-member districts of substantially equal population forces
legislators to ignore, or at best minimally accommodate, existing political
communities. This is not an accident. In its early reapportionment cases,
the Court made clear that in districting plans, population equality trumped
all other possible considerations, including preserving the integrity of
existing political subdivisions, such as county lines.
86. Roxbury Taxpayers All., 80 F.3d at 48 (holding that where unequal-population districts
are used, weighted voting may be used to provide voters with a "degree of representation on the
governing body that is proportionate to the percentage that the district's population bears to the

population of the political unit as a whole").
87. Id. at 45.
88. 975 F. Supp. 191 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
89. Id at 192.
90. Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
91. Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(SR), 2001 WL 967552, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug.
8, 2001).
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While equal-population districting rapidly resolved the problem of
malapportioned districts, extinguishing the link between local
government boundaries and electoral district boundaries has created new
problems. In particular, as this Part explains, equal-population districting
leads to gerrymandering, inhibits the formation of political communities,
and hinders regional governance. Section A notes that equal-population
districts are inevitably gerrymandered to influence electoral outcomes.
Section B argues that equal-population districts are inconsistent with the
conception of local governments as independent polities and as
administrative arms of the state. Section C suggests that equal-population
districting prevents the formation of regional governance mechanisms
needed to address modem multijurisdictional problems. 9 2 This Part
argues that weighted-voting systems remedy each of these problems by
preserving the integrity of local government boundaries.
A. Remedy for PoliticalGerrymandering
Equal-population districting has led to the problem of political
gerrymandering. The boundaries of single-member, equal-population
districts must be redrawn every ten years to maintain population equality.
The redistricting process, once praised as an effective response to
malapportioned districts, is now widely condemned as "an open
invitation to gerrymandering." 9 3 Politicians deliberately manipulate
district boundaries "to protect incumbents and to maintain or extend
advantages enjoyed by the dominant party." 9 4 Redistricting is blamed for
reducing the number of competitive election districts around the nation,
decreasing government responsiveness, and creating a sense that
elections are meaningless. 9 5 In his 2016 State of the Union Address,
President Barack Obama flagged gerrymandering as one of the
fundamental problems with American politics and called for an end to the
practice of drawing districts so that "politicians can pick their voters, and
not the other way around." 9 6
92. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Emerging Counties? Prospectsfor Regional Governance
in the Wake ofMunicipal Dissolution, 122 YALE L.J.F. 187, 200-01 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.

org/forum/emerging-counties-prospects-for-regional-govemance-in-the-wake-of-municipal-diss
olution (evaluating obstacles to regional governance).
93. Gardner, supra note 18, at 555-56.

94. Id. at 555.
95. Id. at 556; Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and
Current Consequences, 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 103, 112 (2000) (stating gerrymandering
"contributes to the popular perception that elections do not matter"); Carl Hulse, Seeking to End
Gerrymandering'sEnduringLegacy, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/

01/26/us/politics/seeking-to-end-gerrymanderings-enduring-legacy.html?r=O
who state that "[pleople are so upset that their votes don't count anymore").
96. Hulse, supra note 95.

(quoting experts
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Although the Court has twice held that partisan gerrymandering can
violate the Constitution, it has yet to develop a workable test for
determining when that occurs.97 In Davis v. Bandemer,9 8 the Supreme
Court recognized a cause of action for political gerrymandering, holding
that an electoral process violates the right to vote if it results in the
"consistent[] degrad[ation] ... of voters' influence on the political
process as a whole." 99 The "consistent degradation" standard has been
difficult to apply, leaving scholars and courts struggling to understand the
contours of this aspect of the right to vote.10 0
In 2004, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,olthe Court revisited its test for partisan
gerrymandering. A plurality in Vieth would have reversed Bandemer and
declared partisan gerrymandering nonjusticiable.' 0 2 Meanwhile, three
dissents proposed separate standards for determining when partisan
districting violates the Constitution. 10 3 As Justice Kennedy observed in
his concurring opinion, "there are yet no agreed upon substantive
principles of fairness in districting," and as a result, "we have no basis on
which to define clear, manageable, and politically neutral standards for
measuring the particular burden a given partisan classification imposes
on representational rights." 104
The Court's struggle to identify unconstitutional partisan
gerrymandering reflects the conflict inherent in legislative districting.
When elected officials are charged with drawing their own district
boundaries, they will inevitably do so with an eye toward retaining or
increasing their power.10 5 As Professor James Gardner has observed, "All
97. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion) (rejecting numerous
standards for measuring political gerrymandering); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry,

548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006) (finding that the appellants had not provided "a reliable standard for
identifying unconstitutional political gerrymanders").

98. 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 13, 132.
100. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 282 ("In the lower courts, the legacy of the plurality's test [in
Bandemer] is one long record of puzzlement and consternation."); Samuel Issacharoff, Judging
Politics: The Elusive Questfor JudicialReview ofPoliticalFairness,71 TEx. L. REV. 1643, 1684
(1993) ("Bandemer is a mass of confusion on what the Court actually believes is the constitutional
harm."); Stephanopoulos, supra note 21, at 1382 ("Scholars puzzled over what values the standard
sought to capture . . . .").

101. 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality opinion).
102. Id. at 281.
103. See id at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (proposing inquiry focused on partisan intent);
id. at 346-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (proposing burden-shifting framework); id. at 360-65
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (proposing test based on risk of "unjustified entrenchment" by political
minority).
104. Id. at 307-0)8 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105. See, e.g., id. at 285-86 (majority opinion) (indicating that partisanship is an "ordinary
and lawful motive" in redistricting).
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districting is in some sense gerrymandering: someone stands to gain or
lose from any conceivable redrawing of district lines." 0 6
Commentators have proposed numerous reforms including: various
substantive constitutional standards of fair political competition;1 0 7
sophisticated measures of district compactness;' 8 and procedural
reforms, such as the use of independent districting commissions, 109 or
approval by referendum. 1 0
Each of these proposals seeks to reform the redistricting process itself.
Weighted voting provides another avenue for reform. Rather than
tinkering with an inherently political process, weighted voting avoids it
all together."' Weighted voting satisfies the one-person, one-vote
requirement by adjusting the number of votes in the legislature rather than
by adjusting the lines on a map.1 2 Weighted voting thus eliminates the
106. Gardner, supra note 23, at 1260.
107. See Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of PartisanSymmetry as a JudicialTest
for PartisanGerrymanderingAfter LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2,4-6 (2007) (arguing for a

standard of symmetrical partisan bias for evaluating the constitutionality of districting plans); see
also Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest
Round of CongressionalRedistricting, 2 ELECTION L.J. 179, 213 (2003) (arguing for a standard of
partisan fairness, responsiveness, and accountability); Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymanderingand

PoliticalCartels, 116 HARv. L. REV. 593, 615-17 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan,
Where To Draw the Line?:JudicialReview ofPoliticalGerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 570-

74 (2004).
108. Richard G. Niemi et al., MeasuringCompactnessand the Role ofa Compactness Standard
in a Test for Partisanand Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155, 1159 (1990) (identifying and

classifying the components of compactness); Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third
Criterion: Compactness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L.

& POL'Y REV. 301, 339-51 (1991) (proposing various compactness standards).
109. Bruce E. Cain, RedistrictingCommissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808,

1812-13 (2012).
110. Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections: Direct Democracy and the Future of
Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 688 (2006).
111. Michael Halberstam, Process Failureand TransparencyReform in Local Redistricting,

11 ELECTION L.J. 446, 449 (2012) ("Redistricting is inherently political ...

because it involves

competition and bargaining between interest groups about the allocation of political power."); Kang,

supra note 110, at 688-89 (arguing that redistricting is an inherently political process); Justin Levitt,
Essay: Weighing the Potential of Citizen Redistricting, 44 LOy. L.A. L. REV. 513, 516 (2011)
(arguing that redistricting is an inherently political process "in that multiple complex tradeoffs are
required among multiple goals, with no outcome that clearly serves all of the population equally").

112. Weighted voting does not eliminate the possibility that municipal boundaries themselves
might be altered to affect electoral outcomes. Indeed, local government boundaries are notoriously
drawn along socioeconomic and racial lines to exclude low-income residents and racial minorities.
See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusionat the Urban Fringe,

55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1143 (2008); Ostrow, supra note 92, at 197. A complete analysis of the
interaction between municipal boundary changes and electoral politics is beyond the scope of this
Article. For the moment, suffice it to say that municipal boundaries have an identity and purpose
that transcends electoral politics and are less likely to be altered to further partisan goals. As
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redistricting process that gives rise to claims of partisan gerrymandering.
B. The Role ofLocal Governments
Equal-population districts are also inconsistent with the conception of
local governments as independent polities and as administrative arms of
the state." 3 Ignoring local government boundaries in electoral districting
undermines their status as independent democracies.' 1 4 Ironically, it is
because local governments are considered independent political
communities that the one-person, one-vote requirement even applies at
the local level."' As a matter of federal constitutional law, local
governments have traditionally been treated as administrative arms of the
state. 1 6 In the seminal case of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 1 7 the
Supreme Court characterized local governments as "political
subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising
such of the governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to
them."' 18
Under Hunter, local government formation rests in the "absolute
discretion" of the state;' 19 states are free to enable the formation of local
governments or abolish them completely. If, as Hunter suggests, local
governments are mere creatures of the state, then the one-person, onevote requirement should not apply to local governments. Instead, as
Richard Briffault has argued, "a state ought to be able to design local
governments along the lines it deems appropriate to effectuate its
purposes." 2 0
In Avery v. Midland County,12 1 however, the Court rejected Hunter's
unidimensional view of local governments as administrative agents and
instead recognized that, in practice, "the States universally leave much

Professor James Gardner explains, "[w]e simply do not draw city or county lines for the purpose
of making city and county elections competitive; such jurisdictions are understood to have
political identities distinct from and far more important than the mere partisan affiliation of the
residents who happen to inhabit them at any given moment." Gardner, supra note 18, at 586.
113. 1 MCQUILLIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 2:13 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that local
governments serve both "to assist in the government of the state as an agent of the state" and "to
regulate and to administer the local and internal affairs of the territory in which it is
incorporated").

114. Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968) (recognizing that local governments
exercise autonomous policy making authority in a variety of areas).
115. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 341.
116. Id. at 347.

117. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
118. Id. at 178.
119. Id.
120. Briffault, supra note 6, at 347.

121. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
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policy and decisionmaking to their governmental subdivisions."1 2 2 In
Avery, the Court considered the composition of the Commissioners Court
of Midland County, Texas, which had been districted to enable a tiny
rural minority to elect a majority of the body's members. 1 23 The Court
noted that the government at issue, a county-wide commissioners court,
performed a number of functions that generally affected the residents of
the county, including the imposition of countywide property taxes and
the administration of welfare services. 12 4 In requiring local governments
to comply with the equal-population standard, the Court recognized that
local governments functioned as independent democratic governments,
with constituents of their own.1 2 5
Equal-population apportionment plans that disregard local
government boundaries are thus inconsistent with the Court's own view
of local governments as democratically accountable government bodies
and, in fact, prevent them from serving as a locus of political
participation. As Professor Gardner has argued: "A boundary that is
continually moving is one that is unlikely to serve as any kind of
imaginative focal point for communal identity, much less as a dividing
line between genuinely distinct political communities."l 2 6
In addition, equal-population districting interferes with the state's
ability to use local governments, particularly counties, as administrative
agents. Counties serve as the primary administrative subunit of state
government, charged with performing state functions and delivering state
services within county territory. 127 In that capacity, counties carry out
state functions such as: running elections; assessing, collecting, and
distributing property; operating highway and road networks; recording
legal documents like deeds and marriages; operating jails and
courthouses; and administering public assistance programs.' 28 Until the
reapportionment era, counties also served as the primary unit of
representation in state legislatures. Equal-population districting
eliminates that possibility and requires states to find other means of
structuring their internal administration.

122. Id. at 481.
123. Id. at 476.
124. Id. at 484.
125. See id. at 485-86; see also In re Reapportionment of Colo. Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d
1237, 1248 (Colo. 2002) (en banc) (noting that "[c]ounties and the cities within their boundaries
are already established as communities of interest in their own right, with a functioning legal and
physical local government identity on behalf of citizens that is ongoing").
126. Gardner, supra note 23, at 1242 (footnote omitted).
127. See Ostrow, supra note 92, at 200.
128. See Anderson, supra note 112, at 1140.
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C. Regional Governance
Equal-population districting inhibits the formation of regional
governments. Modem metropolitan regions span city, county, and state
borders. 129 Most Americans live in a small general-purpose municipality,
such as a village or city, located within a much larger metropolitan
region.' 3 0 This nested growth pattern-independent municipality within
interdependent region-is troubling for a variety of reasons. From a
socio-economic perspective, it has polarized metropolitan regions into
areas of concentrated wealth and concentrated poverty. The suburbs grow
at the expense of the urban core, raising concerns regarding distributive
31
justice and the economic welfare of the metropolitan region as a whole.1
From a legal and political perspective, the nested growth pattern gives
rise to a jurisdictional mismatch. Municipal action has an impact far
beyond municipal boundaries. 1 3 2 Yet, there is no politically accountable
unit of government coterminous with the relevant territory with the
capacity to address regional concerns. 13 3
Equal-population districting makes it nearly impossible to create a
regional legislature.' 34 In fact, an insistence on equal-population
districting resulted in the dissolution of two existing regional
governments-New York City's Board of Estimate, which had been

129. Ostrow, supra note 92, at 200-01.
130. Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW. 483,

483-84 (2007).
131. Ostrow, supranote 92, at 200-01; see Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121

YALE L.J. 1364, 1428-29 (2012) (describing suburbinization and analyzing its impact on racial
and economic polarization).
132. Ostrow, supra 92, at 191 (describing extraterritorial impact of local government
activity). See generally Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Land Law Federalism, 61 EMORY L.J. 1397,
1408-09 (2012) (arguing that in the aggregate, local government activity can have significant
regional and national consequences).
133. See Lisa T. Alexander, The Promise and Perils of "New Regionalist"Approaches to
Sustainable Communities, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 637-41 (2011) (describing the failure of
local government law to account for local actions); Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance

Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 511 (2005) (noting a mismatch between governmental
structures that allocate power to small localities and the regional economy); Reynolds, supra note

130, at 498-99 (noting jurisdictional mismatch).
134. Briffault, supra note 6, at 404 ("[E]qual population representation may impede citycounty consolidations, regional governments, or similar efforts to create governance structures
capable of addressing metropolitan area-wide problems."); Cain, supra note 25, at 1110 (noting

that equal-population districting prevents the formation of regional federations). The Supreme
Court Justices who opposed extending the one-person, one-vote requirement to local governments

expressed this concern. See Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 70 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 490-91
(1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 496-97 (Fortas, J., dissenting); id. at 510 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
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composed of the five boroughs of New York City,' 3 5 and the regional
government of the Seattle metropolitan area, which had been composed
of hundreds of independent municipalities in the Seattle metropolitan
area. 13 6 Similarly, a proposal to establish a regional government in the
San Francisco Bay area was defeated when its planners concluded that
they could not preserve representation for individual municipalities
within the regional government. 137
Of course, equal-population districting is not the only obstacle to
regionalism. Proposals for the formation of metropolitan-scale municipal
governments with general taxing and regulatory authority have faced
insurmountable political opposition and have consistently failed to yield
results. 138 And while localities have been willing to participate in
efficiency-oriented initiatives that create economies of scale, improve the
quality of municipal services, or decrease local taxes, they resist equitable
initiatives that redistribute resources, promote racial and economic
integration, or constrain local land-use authority.1 3 9
Nonetheless, a number of factors may increase the drive toward
regional reform. First, as economic and environmental problems
increasingly transcend local boundaries, even small municipalities might
benefit from collaborating on complex multijurisdictional problems.1 4 0
Moreover, an increasing number of state and federal programs require the
formation of regional entities to address multijurisdictional problems.141
135. Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 703 (1989) (ruling that governmental interest
in preserving representation for each Borough could not justify a seventy-eight-percent deviation
from the one-person, one-vote requirement).

136. Cunningham v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 751 F. Supp. 885, 895 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (holding governmental interest in preserving regional legislature did not justify large
deviation from one-person, one-vote requirement).

137. Cain, supra note 25, at 1110.
138. Ostrow, supra note 92, at 191.
139. Id. at 191, 193; cf HENRY CISNEROS, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV.,
REGIONALISM: THE NEw GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY 8-9 (1995) (distinguishing "thingsregionalism" aimed at systems maintenance and efficiency from "people-regionalism" aimed at

lifestyle issues and equity).
140. Briffault, supra note 6, at 344-45 (discussing the need for representative government
that has the capacity and perspective to address changing society); Ostrow, supra note 132, at
1400 ("In a world where capital and information flow freely across national and subnational

boundaries, few regulatory matters can be cabined within the jurisdictional lines of a single state,
let alone a single locality.").

141. For examples of federal programs that require the formation of regional entities, see
Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program Advance Notice and Request for

Comment, 75 Fed. Reg. 6689, 6690 (Feb. 10, 2010) (providing grants to regional consortium in
order to promote "regional planning efforts that integrate housing and transportation decisions,

and increase [the capacity of communities to modernize] land use and zoning [plans]"); MARK
SOLOF, N. JERSEY TRANSP. PLANNING AUTH., INC., HISTORY OF METROPOLITAN PLANNING

ORGANIZATIONS

17

(1998),

http://www.njtpa.org/getmedia/b95661af-dfd4-4e3d-bb87-
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Weighted-voting provides one mechanism for structuring a regional
entity. New York's county-wide weighted-voting plans illustrate this
approach. Each town within the county elects a representative whose vote
is weighted in proportion to the population of the town. Weighted voting
satisfies the one-person, one-vote requirement and enables each town to
be represented as a town despite disparate populations. Weighted voting,
thus, preserves representation for independent municipalities in a
regional body.
III. INEQUALITIES IN LEGISLATIVE REPRESENTATION
As Part I explains, weighted voting satisfies the quantitative oneperson, one-vote requirement by equalizing the mathematic weight of
each vote. In addition, Part II demonstrates that by using political
subdivisions as electoral districts, weighted voting prevents
gerrymandering, strengthens the role of local governments and removes
an obstacle to regional governance. Despite these advantages, critics have
long argued, and this Part recognizes, that weighted voting generates
inequality in several other dimensions of legislative representation. First,
weighted voting does not provide each person with an equal degree of
functional representation. A single legislator with a double vote cannot
perform double the legislative functions, serve on double the number of
committees, or maintain double the contact with her constituents. As a
result, residents of more populous districts may be functionally
underrepresented.
Weighted voting also generates inequality in legislator power. From a
political perspective, a legislator with a larger percentage of the total vote
will be more influential in the legislative body, and more sought after by
voting coalitions and lobbyists. From a mathematical perspective, a
legislator with a larger percentage of the total vote will have voting power
in excess of population. A legislator with fifty-one percent of the vote,
for example, will have one hundred percent of the voting power.
Moreover, weighted-voting plans have the potential to suppress racial and
political electoral minorities. 14 2 In a weighted-voting system, each
representative is elected at-large, from the district as a whole. As in other
at-large schemes, a geographically concentrated minority group that
would constitute a majority of an equal-population district may constitute
only a minority of a larger, more populous, weighted-voting district. As
a result, the minority group may be unable to elect any representatives.

39e617619c7b/MPOhistoryl 998.pdf aspx (summarizing federal legislation that required regional
planning).
142. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) ("This Court has long recognized that
multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may operate to minimize or cancel out the
voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting population.").
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Though the Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality
of weighted voting, this Part argues that weighted voting does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. Section A argues that the Equal Protection
Clause does not require equal functional representation. Section B argues
that the Equal Protection Clause does not require equal voting power.
Section C demonstrates that the Supreme Court permits the use of at-large
voting systems that have a similar capacity to dilute minority voice. Thus,
this Part argues that while it is important to recognize the tradeoffs
inherent in weighted-voting apportionment plans, these tradeoffs do not
preclude their use.
A. FunctionalRepresentation
Weighted voting systems do not provide each voter with an equal
degree of functional representation. The voting rights literature
traditionally recognizes two forms of vote dilution-quantitative and
qualitative. Quantitative vote dilution occurs when districts vary in size
so that the votes of residents in the more populous districts are
numerically diluted.1 4 3 The one-person, one-vote cases deal with
quantitative vote dilution. Qualitative vote dilution occurs when electoral
practices marginalize the political strength of identifiable groups of
voters, for example, when district lines are gerrymandered to prevent
racial minorities from constituting a majority of an electoral district. In
these cases, the quality of representation is reduced because the voter has
less opportunity to elect a candidate of his choice, despite the fact that his
vote is weighted equally with all other votes cast in the same election.1
Weighted voting implicates a third form of vote dilution, which this
Article terms "functional vote dilution." Functional vote dilution occurs
because the number of votes each legislator casts, and correspondingly,
the number of residents each legislator represents, varies between
districts. Functional vote dilution impacts the quality of representation in
contradictory ways. Voters in more populous districts may be
functionally underrepresented because they have fewer physical
representatives advocating on their behalf. At the same time, voters in
less populous districts may be functionally underrepresented because
their representatives have less votes, and less power, than other
representatives. Nonetheless, this Section suggests that the Equal
Protection Clause does not include a right to equal functional
representation.

143. Grant M. Hayden, The Limits ofSocial Choice Theory: A Defense of the Voting Rights

Act, 74 TUL. L. REV. 87, 91 (1999); Karlan, supra note 22, at 176.
144. Hayden, supra note 143, at 94; Karlan, supra note 22, at 176.
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1. Recognizing Functional Vote Dilution
Weighted voting compensates residents in more populated districts by
granting their legislators additional votes. Yet this adjustment addresses
only one component of legislative representation. Legislators do far more
than simply vote. They participate in policy making by serving on
legislative committees, by participating in floor debates, and by
developing expertise in various policy areas. Furthermore, they provide
a range of constituent services-maintaining contact with residents and
district stakeholders, helping constituents navigate government
bureaucracies, and allocating funds within the district. 145
In contrast to the number of votes, these functional aspects of
representation cannot be weighted. In an early case rejecting weighted
voting, a New York court noted: "If voting were the only important
function of a legislator, [weighted voting] would probably not offend 'the
basic standard of equality' among districts. But legislators have
numerous important functions that have nothing directly to do with
voting .... 14 6 Similarly, another court observed: "The question arises as
to whether a legislator from Little Falls is permitted to make 9 times as
many speeches, 9 times as many telephone calls and have 9 times as much
patronage? When they serve on a committee together, does one legislator
7
have 9 times as much power on that committee?" 4
In addition to performing legislative tasks, the number of
representatives each district elects shapes the deliberative dynamic and

145. See Heinz Eulau & Paul D. Karps, The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying
Components of Responsiveness, 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 233, 241 (1977) (outlining three varieties of
non-policymaking responsiveness: service responsiveness, allocation responsiveness, and
symbolic responsiveness); Joshua Bone, Note, Stop Ignoring Pork and Potholes: Election Law
and Constituent Service, 123 YALE L.J. 1406, 1412 (2014) (listing three broad categories of
constituent service activities: "(1) 'representative-as-ombudsman,' i.e., a representative's

attempts to help constituents or groups navigate government bureaucracies; (2) 'accessibility,'
i.e., a representative's efforts to keep in touch with constituents and, particularly, district
stakeholders; and (3) 'appropriations,' i.e., a representative's use of influence within the

legislative process to deliver discretionary funds back to district interests").
146. WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (not vacated as to
constitutionality of fractional voting), appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 986 (1965), aff'd, 382 U.S. 4
(1965), vacated in part as moot, 384 U.S. 887 (1966); see also Briffault, supra note 6, at 408
(describing functions of legislators); Grofman & Scarrow, supranote 6, at 293 ("Perhaps the most
conspicuous feature of a court decision which approves weighted voting . . . is that it assumes a
very narrow view of the role of an elected representative").

147. Morris v. Bd. of Supervisors, 273 N.Y.S.2d 453, 456-57 (Sup. Ct. 1966); see also
Briffault, supra note 6, at 408 ("A legislator from a large district may be given proportionately
more votes than a legislator from a small district, but she cannot engage in proportionately more
activities, devote herself to the negotiation of proportionately more bills, or be in proportionately
more places at the same time.").
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influences the outcome of the deliberation. 148 In some cases, two
representatives may be more effective than a single representative with a
double vote.1 4 9 In other cases, however, a single representative with a
double vote may wield disproportionate power on the legislature. As one
court observed, "Representatives of the larger districts, because of the
weighting of their votes, necessarily have greater influence over the
passage of legislation."s0
Residents of larger districts may receive more services and legislative
attention, simply because their representative has less need to
compromise or build coalitions on the legislative body.' Lobbyists and
other interest groups are more likely to focus on representatives wielding
a larger vote, rather than dividing their efforts equally between multiple
representatives, each wielding a single vote.1 52 Thus, residents of smaller
districts might find that their interests are consistently overlooked.
Weighted voting deprives these residents of the opportunity to elect a
representative that is as powerful as the representative elected from a
larger district.15 3

2. Functional Representation and the Equal Protection Clause
In the aftermath of Reynolds v. Sims, which extended the one-person,
one-vote requirement to state legislative districts, several states
considered adopting weighted-voting schemes as a means of complying
148. Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1763, 1803 (2002)
("[T]he presence of people in the room-and not just their voting power-has an effect on the
outcome.... Adding more people from the more populous towns would change the dynamic of

the discussion."); Weinstein, supranote 16, at 46 ("A deliberative democratic body-a legislature
at its best-requires application of the concept of 'one man, one vote' within the body itself, so
that rational argument among equals can take place.").
149. Bannister v. Davis, 263 F. Supp. 202, 209 (E.D. La. 1966); see also Frug, supra note

148.
150. lannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors of Wash. Cty., 279 N.Y.S.2d 458, 459 (App. Div. 1967),
aff'd, 229 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1967); see Morris v. Bd. of Supervisors, 273 N.Y.S.2d 453, 457 (Sup.
Ct. 1966) ("All of the personal attributes and characteristics of the elected legislator, his diligence,
intelligence, ability, practicality, interest and knowledge concerning pending ligislation [sic]
should not be frustrated by the weight of a colleague who may be able to cast 8, 10 or 12 times
his vote on any given issue.").
151. Wesolowski, supra note 6, at 1906.
152. See WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (noting that
smaller districts are disadvantaged because lobbyists "will tend to woo only those legislators with
full votes, since more effort is involved in convincing a series of legislators who share one vote"),
appeal dismissed, 379 U.S. 986 (1965), af'd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated in part as moot, 384

U.S. 887 (1966) (not vacated as to constitutionality of fractional voting).
153. See Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Note,
The Application of Reynolds, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1248, 1256-57 (1966) (arguing that voters in
smaller districts would object because their representatives would have far less bargaining power
than representatives of larger districts).
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with the one-person, one-vote requirement without disturbing the existing
arrangement of unequal districts.' 5 4 When these apportionment plans
were challenged, courts in several states, including Hawaii,15 5
Louisiana,156 Nebraska,' 5 7 and New York,15 8 determined that weighted
voting in state legislatures did not comply with the Equal Protection
Clause's equal-weight requirement because it did not equalize
representation in aspects other than voting.' 5 9
In New York, for example, the legislature considered four
apportionment plans, two of which involved weighted voting.1 60 A report
prepared by a Citizen's Committee appointed by the Governor argued that
weighted voting would cause "a dilution of legislative representation"
because many legislative functions, such as speaking on the floor and
committee membership, cannot be weighted.161 In WMCA, Inc. v.
Lomenzo,1 62 the Southern District of New York agreed, concluding that
weighted voting violated the Equal Protection Clause.1 63
In Evenwel v. Abbott,1 64 however, the Supreme Court suggested that
there is no federal constitutional right to equal functional
representation.' 65 In Evenwel, the Supreme Court rejected the claim that
the Equal Protection Clause requires states to equalize the number of
eligible voters in each district.1 66 Instead, the Court upheld a state
legislative map that equalized the total population of each district.1 67
According to the Court, total-population apportionment promotes
"equitable and effective representation," "[b]y ensuring that each
representative is subject to requests and suggestions from the same
154. Banzhaf, supra note 14.

155. Eg., Bums v. Gill, 316 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (D. Haw. 1970).
156. E.g., Bannister v. Davis, 263 F. Supp. 202, 209 (E.D. La. 1966).
157. E.g., League of Neb. Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189, 195 (D. Neb. 1962).
158. E.g., WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 238 F. Supp. 916, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), appeal
dismissed, 379 U.S. 986 (1965), aff'd, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), vacated in part as moot, 384 U.S. 887
(1966) (not vacated as to constitutionality of fractional voting).
159. See also Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 735, 736 (N.J. 1964); Brown v. State Election
Bd., 369 P.2d 140, 149 (Okla. 1962).
160. See Charo, supra note 13, at 786.
161. N.Y. CITIZENS COMM. ON REAPPORTIONMENT, REPORT TO GOVERNOR NELSON A.

ROCKEFELLER 36 (1964).

162. WMCA, Inc., 238 F. Supp. at 923.
163. Id. at 924. Although the state appealed this issue, the Supreme Court did not address it.
See Charo, supra note 13, at 788 ("In 1966, following judicial reapportionment of the legislature
and agreement of all parties, the Supreme Court 'vacated as moot' the judgment of the district

court as to [the weighted-voting plans].").
164. 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016).
165. Id. at 1132 & n.14.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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number of constituents."1 68 Yet, the Court acknowledged that
constituents do not have a constitutional right "to equal access to their
elected representatives." 69 Thus, under Evenwel, equal functional
representation seems to be a reasonable state policy, but not a
constitutional mandate.
Indeed, at the national level, the number of residents each legislator
represents already varies dramatically. The Constitution guarantees each
state at least one seat in the House of Representatives, even if its total
population is lower than the average population of House districts
nationwide. 7 0 As a result, a representative from the state of Montana
represents almost twice as many residents as a representative from the
adjacent state of Wyoming."' In the Senate, the population disparity is
obviously far more extreme. Each state elects two senators, despite the
fact that the most populous state, California, has sixty-six times more
people than the least populous state, Wyoming. 172 Senate staffing
allowances, however, vary by state population so that senators from more
populous states are able to hire larger staffs. 173 This process allows
senators to perform their legislative functions despite vast discrepancies
in state population. Though representation in the Senate is quite
obviously unique, variable staffing allowances could similarly be used to
equalize functional representation in weighted-voting systems.
In contrast to state-wide plans, in countywide weighted-voting plans,
courts have generally dismissed concerns over equal functional
representation.1 74 In lannucci v. Board of Supervisors,175 New York's
highest court upheld weighted voting and determined that inequalities in

168. Id. at 1132.
169. Id. atll32n.14.
170. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

171. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1144 (2016) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing census
data).
172. Id.
173. PAUL E. DWYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30064, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
CONGRESSIONAL SALARIES AND ALLOWANCES, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 7 (2004),

http://www.menshealthnetwork.org/library/CRSCongresssalariesRL30064.pdf. In the fiscalyear-2013 legislative-branch appropriations bill, the size of the average Senate staffing allowance
was $3,209,103, with individual accounts ranging from $2,960,716 to $4,685,632, depending on
the population of the senators' states. S. REP. No. 112-197, at 20 (2012).
174. Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 6, at 293 ("In approving weighted voting the New York
courts have either ignored these arguments completely or not deemed them to be of overriding

importance."); see also Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49
(2d Cir. 1996) (noting that despite inequalities in functional representation "there is nothing in the
record to indicate that [the County's] weighted-voting system provides representation that is not
qualitatively fair and effective").

175. 229 N.E.2d 195 (N.Y. 1967).
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legislator power are not constitutionally significant. 1 7 6 The lannucci
Court recognized that, "in any weighted voting scheme, those
representatives who cast the larger aggregates of votes can be expected
to have greater influence with their colleagues than representatives with
only a single vote." 1 77 The lannucci Court maintained, however, that
there is "nothing unconstitutional in a disparity of influence" among the
representatives.1 7 8 The court concluded that the number of votes was just
one among many variables that legitimately influence legislator power.
The Second Circuit came to a similar conclusion in Reform of
179
i
Schoharie County v. Schoharie County Board of Supervisors.
weighted
that
claim
the
rejected
court
Schoharie County, the district
voting apportionment plans violate the Equal Protection Clause because
they do not equalize functional representation. The towns in Schoharie
County varied in size-from 332 to 7270 residents. 8 0 Nonetheless, the
court determined that there was no qualitative difference in the-voters'
access to their elected representative, or in any of the other nonvoting
functions, such as participation in committees, legislative debate or
discussion with other supervisors.'i On appeal, the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision, holding that at the local level,
supervisors are likely to be able to provide fair and effective
182
representation despite the fact that the towns differ in size.
Indeed, inequalities in functional representation are arguably less
compelling in local apportionment plans than they are in state-wide plans.
The Supreme Court has long emphasized the need for flexibility in local
governance, noting in Avery v. Midland County that the one-person, onevote requirement is not intended to act as a "roadblock in the path of
innovation, experiment, and development among units of local
government." 83 The Supreme Court has thus cautioned against a rigid
approach to population equality in local apportionment plans, noting that
"an unrealistic overemphasis on raw population figures" may cause

176. Id. at 198-99.
177. Id.
178. Id at 199.
179. 975 F. Supp. 191 (N.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 152 F.3d 920 (2d Cir. 1998).
180. This number includes students from SUNY Cobleskill. Id. at 192. The court later states
that the population of the largest town is 5670, which presumably does not include those SUNY
students. Id. at 193 n.1.
181. Id. at 196.
182. 152 F.3d at 920. The Supreme Court similarly tolerates "slightly greater percentage

deviations" from population equality at the local level because "local legislative bodies frequently
have fewer representatives," and local legislative districts have smaller populations than do their
state and national counterparts. Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 185 (1971).

183. Avery v. Midland Cty., 390 U.S. 474, 485 (1968).
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courts to overlook other factors more critical to an "acceptable
representation and apportionment arrangement." 8 4
Moreover, at the local level, voters have the capacity to influence
policy making in a variety of ways apart from functional representation
in the legislative body. Local governments offer numerous forums for
meaningful participation in local decision and policy making. Residents
can participate in local zoning boards, business improvement districts and
neighborhood councils, among others.' 8 5 These sub-local political
institutions exhibit the traits most closely associated with political
participation: they are small, yet powerful.1 86 Citizen participation in
policy making is presumably easier at the local level. 87 The costs of
participation in terms of the time, energy, and money needed to reach out,
engage, and persuade other members of the polity are likely to be lower
in smaller units than in larger ones.18 8 Thus, at the local level, voters
need not rely solely on the power of their vote to affect policy but can
participate directly in a variety of ways.1 8 9
B. Inequality in Voting Power
In addition to inequality in political power, critics of weighted voting,
notably Professor John Banzhaf, argue that population-based weighted
voting does not equalize voting power, or the mathematic probability

184. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749 (1973); see also League of Women Voters,
737 F.2d 155 (noting that the Supreme Court's review of local apportionment plans is "noteworthy
for the nonpromulgation of strict mathematical tests," so that "the theme-especially concerning

units of local government-has been flexibility").
185. Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking
Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REV. 371, 374 (2008). See
generally Richard Briffault, A Governmentfor Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and

Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 365, 366 (1999) (detailing business improvement
districts); Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and Neighborhood
Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 137, 166-87 (2008)

(providing an overview of neighborhood councils).
186. Ostrow, supra note 132, at 1443.
187. See Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in FederalSiting Regimes, 48 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 289, 303 (2011).
188. See ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 41-42 (1973).
189. See Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the
Religious Land Use andInstitutionalizedPersonsAct, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 321 (2003) ("The smaller

the polity in geography and in population, the easier it is for the people (1) to monitor what their
government is doing, (2) to criticize or praise, and therefore (3) to affect public policy."); see also
Gardner, supra note 23, at 1247 ("The local arena thus provides a much more congenial
environment for citizens to derive the developmental benefits of democratic participation than
national or other comparatively remote levels of government because the opportunities for

participation are more numerous on the local level, and because individuals can make more of a
difference in small-scale local politics.").
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each legislator has of determining legislative outcomes.19 0 To illustrate,
consider ajurisdiction where a single district contains sixty percent of the
total population. If the legislator representing that district is granted sixty
percent of the total number of votes, the legislator will have one hundred
percent of the voting power in the legislature.191 In contrast, in a
legislature composed of equal population districts, each legislator casts a
19 2
single ballot and has an equal power to affect the legislative outcome.
Rather than allocate votes in proportion to population, Banzhaf argued
that votes should be apportioned so that each legislator is able to
determine the outcome of as many legislative matters as they would have
been able to determine in a legislature composed of equal population
districts. 193 Using the so-called Banzhaf Index to adjust the allocation of
weighted votes, an official whose district contains fifteen percent of the
county population would be assigned a number of weighted votes needed
94
to cast the tie-breaking vote in fifteen percent of the board's decisions.1

190. According to Professor Banzhaf:

In almost all cases weighted voting does not do the one thing which both its
supporters and opponents assume that it does: weighted voting does not allocate
voting power among legislators in proportion to the population each represents
because voting power is not proportionalto the number ofvotes a legislatormay
cast.
Banzhaf, supra note 14, at 318; see also John F. Banzhaf III, Multimember ElectoralDistrictsDo They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle?, 75 YALE L.J. 1309, 1310 (1966)
(providing a mathematical method for measuring voting power to display the "inequities" of
multimember districts); John F. Banzhaf III, One Man, ? Votes: MathematicalAnalysis of Voting
Power and Effective Representation, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 808, 809 (1968) (arguing that

disparities in legislative voting power have an impact on representation).
191. lannucci v. Bd. of Supervisors, 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967).
192. Bernard Grofman & Howard Scarrow, lannucci and Its Aftermath: The Application of
the BanzhafIndex to Weighted Voting in the State ofNew York, in GAME THEORY AND THE U.S.

COURTS 170 (S. J. Brams et al. eds., 1979).
193. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 145-46 n.23 (1971) (explaining the Banzhaf
method); Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 246
(N.D.N.Y. 1995) ("This system used a computer driven statistical analysis to assign 'voting
power' to each representative, so that the power of each representative to affect the outcome of
votes by casting the tie-breaking ballot in a theoretical number of possible voting combinations

was equal to the percentage of the total county population of his or her town."), aff'd, 80 F.3d 42
(2d Cir. 1996); Jackson v. Nassau Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509, 522 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
("[T]he crux of the Banzhaf theory is that the true test of voting power is the ability to cast a tiebreaking, or critical vote."); Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 6, at 290-92.
194. In Delaware County, the district court distinguished between population-based and

Banzhaf-based weighted voting models as follows:
In the simple arithmetic model, the number of actual votes are distributed in
proportion to the percentage of the total district population in each unit. In a
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In contrast, under a population-based system, the official would be
assigned fifteen percent of the total number of votes.195
The voting power argument has had mixed results. In an early New
York case, the New York Court of Appeals accepted Banzhaf's argument
and required counties to use Banzhaf-based weighted voting plans to
equalize each legislator's voting power. 196 The Supreme Court, however,
has twice rejected Banzhaf's arguments and held that inequality in voting
power does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.' 97 The Court first
rejected Banzhaf's voting power argument in the context of multimember
districts in the 1971 case of Whitcomb v. Chavis.'9 8 In Whitcomb, the
plaintiffs argued that multimember districts do not satisfy the one-person,
one-vote requirement because they do not equalize the voting power of
each voter. 199 The Supreme Court, however, rejected Banzhaf's
definition of voting power and held that multimember districts in which
representatives were allocated in proportion to population satisfied the
quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement. 200
The Court next rejected Banzhaf's argument in its 1989 decision in
BoardofEstimate v. Morris.2 0 1In Morris, the Court invalidated the "oneborough, one-vote" apportionment scheme for NYC's Board of
Estimate.2 0 2 The City calculated the total deviation from population
equality using the Banzhaf Index, and argued that the deviation was
justified by the City's interest in preserving its borough-based system.20 3
Banzhaf-based model, the weighted votes are apportioned to each representative

based on the theoretical voting power each representative should possess.
&

Roxbury Taxpayers All., 886 F. Supp. at 248 n.10. See generally DAN S. FELSENTHAL

MOSHE MACHOVER, THE MEASUREMENT OF VOTING POWER: THEORY AND PRACTICE, PROBLEMS,

AND PARADOxEs 82-83, 142, 160 (1998) (noting that the U.S. Electoral College and the European
Union use variations of the Banzhaf Index to adjust voting power).

195. Roxbury Taxpayers All., 886 F. Supp. at 248 n. 10.
196. lannucci v. Board of Supervisors, 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967) (requiring that each
"legislator's voting power, measured by the mathematical possibility of his casting a decisive
vote, must approximate the power he would have in a legislative body which did not employ

weighted voting"); see also Franklin v. Krause, 298 N.E.2d 68, 70 (N.Y. 1973) (upholding
Banzhaf-based weighted voting plan); Grofman & Scarrow, supra note 6, at 292 (describing
lannucci as a "remarkable decision, standing as one of the most conspicuous examples ever
recorded of a judicial decision based squarely on the findings of scholarly research").

197. Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 699 (1989); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.
124, 147 (1971); see also Paul H. Edelman, Making Votes Count in Local Elections: A
MathematicalAppraisal ofAt-Large Representation, 4 ELECTION L.J. 258, 271 (2005).

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

403 U.S. 124 (1971).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 145-46.
489 U.S. 688 (1989).
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 697-98.
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The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the Banzhaf Index as merely
a "theoretical explanation of each board member's power to affect the
outcome of board actions." 204 The Court calculated the deviation from
population equality using a population-based apportionment formula and
determined that the resulting seventy-eight-percent deviation could not
20 5
be justified based on "exigencies of history or convenience."
Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the Banzhaf Index, the status
of Banzhaf-based weighted-voting plans remains unsettled.2 06 The New
York Court of Appeals decision requiring counties to adopt Banzhafbased weighted voting plans has not been overturned.20 7 As a result,
counties in New York continue to use Banzhaf-based systems. Essex
County, for example, used the Banzhaf Index to adjust its allocation of
votes following the 2010 census. 208
In contrast, the federal courts require that votes be allocated in
proportion to population. 209 In Reform ofSchoharie County v. Schoharie
County Board of Supervisors,2 10 for example, the district court upheld a
weighted-voting scheme under which each supervisor cast "a number of
votes roughly proportionate to his or her town's percentage share of the
total population of the County."2 1 1 In some cases, however, the Banzhaf
Index produces an allocation of votes that mirrors the allocation that
would be produced if votes were distributed in proportion to population,
making it possible to comply with both the federal and state standard.2 1 2
204. Id. at 699.
205. Id. at 702-03 n.10.
206. See Jackson v. Nassau County Board of Supervisors, 818 F. Supp. 509, 535 (E.D.N.Y.
1993) (striking down Nassau County's Banzhaf-based weighted-voting plan); see also Emery,
supra note 6, at 168 ("[W]eighted voting, as we now know it under the Banzhaf scheme, has to
be eliminated."); M. David Gelfand & Terry E. Allbritton, Conflict and Congruence in OnePerson, One- Vote andRacial Vote Dilution Litigation: Issues Resolved and Unresolved by Board
of Estimate v. Morris, 6 J.L. & POL. 93, 113 (1989) ("Morris, then, has cast considerable doubt
upon the continuing validity of the method employed by courts in weighted voting cases.").

207. lannucci v. Washington County, 229 N.E.2d 195, 199 (N.Y. 1967).
208. Lohr

McKinstry,

Slight Power Shift,

PRESS

REPUBLICAN

(Apr.

13,

2012),

http://www.pressrepublican.com/news/local news/slight-power-shift/article_16140991 -dc49-5e
84-aaa6-cfbda4470f50.html (noting that in Essex County, the town of Ticonderoga has thirteen
percent of the county population and thirteen percent of the voting power, not thirteen percent of

the actual number of votes).
209. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1996)
(upholding weighted-voting plan that provides voters with representation "that is proportionate to
the percentage that the district's population bears to the population of the political unit as a

whole"); Jackson, 818 F. Supp. at 535 (rejecting the Banzhaf model).
210. 975 F. Supp. 191 (N.D.N.Y. 1997).
211. Id at 192.
212. Id. at n.1 (noting only "minor differences between the votes allotted by the Banzhaf

method . .

and those which would be allotted by strictly arithmetical computation" (alteration in
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C. Minority Vote Dilution

Under a weighted-voting plan, each district's representative is elected
at-large from the district as a whole. At-large voting tends to minimize
the voting strength of minority groups by permitting the political majority
to elect all of the district's representatives. 2 13 As the Supreme Court has
explained, a distinct minority, whether it be a racial, ethnic, economic, or
political group, may be unable to elect any representatives in an at-large
election, yet may be able to elect several representatives if the political
unit is divided into single-member districts.2 14
A typical example in a multimember jurisdiction is a five-member
county commission in a county where black persons make up forty
percent of the population. Although black voters may prefer different
candidates, the white sixty-percent majority can always outvote the black
minority, shutting out black voters and filling all five seats with whitepreferred candidates. 2 15 So too in a weighted-voting jurisdiction, the
white majority can always outvote the black minority and elect a whitepreferred candidate. 2 16 For this reason, the Supreme Court prefers singlemember districts unless there is "a 'singular combination of unique
factors' that justifies a different result." 2 17
Still, at-large voting is not per se unconstitutional.2 18 Instead,
particular instances of at-large voting are subject to challenge under § 2
of the Voting Rights Act if they dilute the voting strength of racial
minorities. In 1966, in Burns v. Richardson,2 1 9 the Court held that the use
of multimember state legislative districts is not per se unconstitutional.2 2 0
original)); Grofman & Sparrow, supra note 6, at 298 (noting that except in rare cases with extreme

population deviations between districts, the allocation of votes based upon the Banzhaf-based
model deviates only slightly from the strict arithmetic model).
213. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47-48 (1986) (quoting Bums v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 88 (1966)) (recognizing that "multimember districts and at-large voting schemes may
'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial [minorities in] the voting
population."'); see also O'Neill, supra note 18, at 348-49 ("The discrimination inherent in at-

large voting is widely recognized. Academics criticize at-large voting for suppressing minority
representation.").

214. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 46-48.
215. Mulroy, supra note 22, at 338.
216. See Briffault, supra note 6, at 411. Some have suggested that a concern about the

minority vote dilution features of weighted voting and likelihood of a Voting Rights challenge led
New York City to abolish the Board of Estimate rather than maintain borough representation with
weighted votes. See Frank J. Mauro, Voting Rights and the Board ofEstimate: The Emergence of
an Issue, 37 PROC. ACAD. POL. Sci. 62, 67 (1989).

217. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (quoting Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
333 (1973)).
218. E.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 57 (1980).
219. 384 U.S. 73 (1966).
220. Id. at 88.
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The Court noted, however, that the use of multimember districts may be
"subject to challenge where the circumstances of a particular case may
'operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political
elements of the voting population."' 22 1 Subsequently, in City ofMobile v.
Bolden,22 2 the Supreme Court refused to invalidate the use of
multimember districts unless the plaintiffs could show discriminatory
purpose. 223
In response, in 1982, Congress amended the Voting Rights Act "to
make clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory
effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the 'results
test."' 224 In Thornburg v. Gingles,225 the Court explained, "The essence
of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred
representatives." 2 26
Under the Gingles test, a minority group that contends that the
multimember form of districting violates its constitutional rights must
demonstrate that: (1) it is sufficiently large and geographically compact
to constitute a majority in a single-member legislative district, (2) it is
politically cohesive, and (3) the majority votes are sufficient, as a bloc,
to enable the majority to usually defeat the preferred candidate of the
minority. 22 The Gingles test has been extended to equal-population
districts and would likely apply to weighted-voting districts as well.22 8
Courts will reject weighted-voting plans under § 2 of the Voting Rights
Act if they diminish the influence of racial minorities, regardless of
whether they were intended to do so. Thus, weighted voting is
constitutional, though compliance with the Voting Rights Act will
impose some limits on the jurisdictions in which weighted voting can be
implemented.
IV.

HYBRID WEIGHTED-VOTING PLANS

Although weighted voting systems equalize the mathematical weight
of each vote, they do not equalize all aspects of legislative representation.
Instead, as Part III explains, weighted voting generates inequality in
221. Id.
222. 446 U.S. 55 (1980), superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89110, 79 Stat. 437 (amended 1982), as recognized in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30,35 (1986).
223. Id. at 70, 73.
224. Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 35.
225. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
226. Id. at 47.
227. Id. at 50-51.
228. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25, 40-42 (1993) (applying the Gingles test to singlemember, equal-population districts).
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functional representation and voting power, and increases the risk of
minority vote dilution. While these considerations deserve careful
attention from a policy perspective, Part III argues that they do not render
weighted voting unconstitutional per se. The Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the constitutionality of weighted voting, but it has
indicated that the Constitution does not require equality in functional
representation or in voting power, and does not preclude the use of atlarge voting systems despite the risk of minority vote dilution. Moreover,
as this Part explains, the inequalities inherent in weighted-voting plans
decrease as districts become closer in size. Indeed, equal-population
districts have long been preferred precisely because they equalize
functional representation and legislator power, and reduce the risk of
minority vote dilution.
Thus, this Part proposes combining weighted voting with equalpopulation districts to form districts that correspond to political
subdivisions, yet contain roughly the same number of people. Section A
argues that weighted voting is uniquely able to equalize the mathematical
weight of each vote across unequal-population districts. Indeed, while
both weighted-voting and multimember districting preserve
representation for political units, only weighted voting does so without
producing any deviation from numeric equality. Section B demonstrates
that combining weighted voting with equal-population districts
maximizes the advantages of each apportionment system. Hybrid
weighted-voting districts prevent gerrymandering and preserve
representation for political subdivisions; equalize functional
representation and legislator power; reduce the risk of minority vote
dilution; and satisfy the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement.
A. Weighted-Voting Versus Multimember Districting
Both multimember districts and weighted-voting districts are
designed to preserve representation for political subdivisions while
complying with the one-person, one-vote requirement.2 2 9 In a
multimember system, each district elects a number of representatives in
proportion to the district's population. In a weighted-voting system, each
district elects a single representative, whose vote is weighted in
proportion to the district's population.
Though both systems use proportional representation to equalize the
mathematical weight of each vote, the single representative feature of
weighted voting creates more troubling inequalities in voter
representation. First, it is the single representative feature of weighted
voting that produces functional vote dilution.230 In a multimember
229. See supra Section I.A.
230. See supra Section III.A.
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system, each elected representative can perform all of his non-voting
functions. He can serve on a committee, participate in legislative
hearings, meet with constituents, and vote in the legislative body. In
contrast to weighted voting, multimember districting provides equal
functional representation to each resident.23 1
In addition, the single representative feature of weighted voting
distorts legislator power. This is true in both a political sense-lobbyists
and interest groups are more likely to target those legislators wielding the
highest number of votes-as well as from a mathematical perspective,
voting
weighted
demonstrated,
Banzhaf
John
as
where,
more
from
legislators
of
power
voting
the
increases
disproportionately
232
populous districts.
Finally, although both multimember districts and weighted-voting
districts have the capacity to dilute minority voice, weighted voting
magnifies the impact in two ways. First, in multimember districts, there
is the potential, particularly using cumulative voting or other alternative
233
voting mechanisms, for a minority group to get one or two seats.
contrast, in a weighted-voting district, the majority elects a single
representative. The minority has no opportunity to elect any
representatives. Second, in multimember districts, the individual
representatives may disagree with each other and cast conflicting votes.
In a weighted-voting district, however, the single representative casts all
her votes in a bloc, thereby fully eliminating representation for racial and
political minorities within a weighted-voting district.
Moreover, although the current consensus clearly favors singlemember, equal-population districts, multimember districts have long
been used in the United States. 2 3 4 Until the 1960s, many states used
multimember districts to preserve representation for political
23 5
The National
subdivisions, such as counties, in their state legislatures.
Conference of State Legislatures reports that in 2009, thirteen states used
multimember districts in their legislatures. 2 3 6 Weighted voting, in

23 1. Of course, representatives who are elected at-large, as in a multimember district, will
be accountable to the entire jurisdiction, rather than to a particular subset of the jurisdiction, as in
a single-member district. The merits of at-large representation versus single-district representation
have long been debated and need not be addressed here. See generally Edelman, supra note 197,
258-63; Ruth C. Silva, Compared Values of the Single- and the Multi-Member Legislative

District, 17 W. POL. Q. 504, 506 (1964).
232. See supra Section I1I.B.
233. Mulroy, supra note 22, at 341.

234. Edelman, supra note 197, at 260.
235. Id; see also James A. Gardner, Foreword, Representation Without Party: Lessons from
State ConstitutionalAttempts to Control Gerrymandering,37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 914-15 (2006).
236. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supranote 1, at 136-37.
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contrast, has never been widely used and has rarely been considered as
an alternative approach to electoral districting. 237
Why then use weighted voting rather than multimember districting?
Simply put, multimember districting can make it difficult to preserve
representation for political subdivisions within a constitutionally
permissible deviation from population equality. To allocate a whole
number of representatives to each multimember district, the number of
representatives must be rounded up or down. The rounding process can
create impermissibly large deviations from population equality and result
in the creation of an unreasonably large legislative body. Weighted
voting, and only weighted voting, is capable of equalizing the numeric
weight of each vote across unequal-population districts with the
mathematical precision required to consistently meet the constitutional
one-person, one-vote requirement.
1. Deviation from Population Equality
The Supreme Court has established a presumption of constitutionality
for state and local apportionment plans that deviate by less than ten
percent from population equality.23 8 Multimember districting can make it
difficult to stay within that range. For example, consider a county
districting plan where the smallest district has 100 residents. In that
county, a town with 151 residents would be allocated two representatives,
while a town with 149 residents would have only one. Although the
population of these two towns is nearly identical, the first receives twice
as much legislative representation as the second.2 3 9
The Supreme Court acknowledged this concern in its 1971 decision
in Abate v. Mundt.24 0 In Abate, the Court upheld Rockland County's
multimember districting plan that used the county's five towns as
electoral districts. 24 1 Under Rockland County's plan, the smallest town
was allocated one representative, a town that was 4.3 times as large was
allocated 4 representatives, while a town that was 4.8 times as large was
237. See supra notes 6-12.

238. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1124 (2016) ("Where the maximum population
deviation between the largest and smallest district is less than 10%, the Court has held, a state or
local legislative map presumptively complies with the one-person, one-vote rule."); Brown v.

Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) ("[The Court's] decisions have established, as a general
matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within
this category of minor deviations.").

239. See Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 820 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting
that "the voters of the second town would elect half as many county legislators as the nearly
identical number of voters of the third town while simultaneously having one-third less voting
power than the voters in the first town").

240. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
241. Id. at 184 n.1.
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242
Because the number of representatives
allocated 5 representatives.
each town elected was rounded to the nearest whole number, the plan
deviated from population equality by 11.9%.243 The Abate Court noted
the potential for multimember districting to produce large deviations, but
mindful of the new and experimental nature of the Rockland County Plan,
refused to invalidate it on that basis, stating: "[W]e express no opinion on
the contention that, in future years, the Rockland County plan may
produce substantially greater deviations than presently exist. Such
questions can be answered if and when they arise."244
Indeed, when a federal court reconsidered Rockland County's
multimember districting plan thirty years later, it observed that the plan
had, in fact, produced a substantially greater deviation from population
equality and could no longer be sustained.2 4 5 The court ordered Rockland
County to reduce its deviation below the constitutionally permissible
threshold by districting for single-member, equal-population districts or
by adopting weighted voting which, the court acknowledged, would
enable it to preserve its town-based legislative body.2 4 6
In contrast to multimember districting, weighted-voting schemes have
no trouble preserving representation for existing political units without
deviating from population equality. Because weighted-voting schemes
grant each representative a percentage of the total number of votes, there
is no need to round the number of votes allocated to each representative.
If a town containing 4.3% of the population is granted 4.3% of the votes,
there is zero-percent deviation from population equality.2 4 7 Weightedvoting systems, thus, produce precise mathematical equality.

2. Size of the Legislative Body
In addition to producing a large deviation from population equality,
multimember districting systems may cause the legislature to become
unreasonably large. For example, if a district with 100 residents is
allocated one representative, then a district with 1,000 residents would
have ten representatives, and a district with 2,000 residents would have
twenty representatives. The total size of the legislature can quickly

242. Id. at 184-86.
243. Id at 185-87.
244. Id at 186 n.3.
245. Abate v. Rockland Cty. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. 817, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
246. Id.
247. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 80 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 1996)
(calculating deviation by comparing the "percent of total population represented by a given local
official to the percent of weighted votes allocated to that official").
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become unwieldy. 2 48
Moreover, there is an inherent tension between keeping the legislature
a manageable size and keeping deviations from population equality
within constitutional limits. In Rockland County, for example, population
changes reflected in the 1980 federal census increased the deviation from
equality from 11.9% to 26.4%.249 To reduce the deviation to a barely
acceptable 17.8% deviation, the County had to increase the size of the
legislature from 18 to 21 representatives. 2 50 Following the 1990 census,
the deviation had risen to an unconstitutional 19.8%.251 To reduce the
deviation to a constitutionally permissible ten percent, the County would
have had to increase the size of the legislature to forty-two members, an
increase that would have defeated the County's goal of maintaining an
efficient legislative body. 252
Weighted voting, quite obviously, avoids this problem entirely by
limiting each district to a single representative regardless of the size of
the district. Indeed, the district court suggested weighted voting as an
alternative to multimember districting because it would enable Rockland
County to preserve representation for each constituent town on the county
board, while maintaining a small legislative body and providing each
resident with an equally weighted vote. 253 In many cases, weighted voting
is the only apportionment plan that enables a legislative body to meet all
three criteria simultaneously.
B. Hybrid Weighted-Voting Systems
As the district court in Abate v. Rockland County Legislature noted,
weighted-voting would have permitted Rockland County to preserve
representation for each town on the county legislature while providing
each resident with a mathematically equally weighted vote. Indeed, more
than a dozen counties in New York use weighted voting for precisely that
purpose. In some New York counties, each town elects a single
representative whose vote is weighted in proportion to the town's
population. 2 54 In Delaware County, for example,
the registered voters in each town periodically elect one
town supervisor. The elected town supervisor represents his
248. Gardner, supra note 18, at 584; id. at 588 (noting that in a large multimember district,
"the sheer amount of information voters must process may exceed the capacity and interest even

of well-informed and highly motivated voters").
249. Rocdand Cly. Legislature, 964 F. Supp. at 820-21.
250. Id. at 830.
251. Id. at 818.
252. Id. at 821.
253. See id. at 830.
254. See supra notes 67-70.
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or her town on the county Board of Supervisors. Thus, voters
of each town are represented by a single member of the
board, regardless of the population of the town in which they
reside and vote.2 5 5
Votes on the Board are distributed according to each town's percentage
of the total county population. The smallest town contains 1% of the total
county population and is allocated 1% of the total number of votes on the
Board. The largest town contains 14% of the total county population and
is allocated 14% of the total number of votes. 2 5 6
If towns vary significantly in size, however, a traditional "one-town,
one-representative" model has the potential to generate significant
inequality in the non-voting dimensions of legislative representation. If a
town with 5% of the population and a town with 40% of the population
are each represented by a single legislator, residents of the larger town
will be underrepresented because they have only one physical
representative on the legislature, and overrepresented because their
representative casts close to a majority of the total number of votes.
If districts are roughly the same size, however, these inequalities are
reduced. Roughly-equal-population districts can be formed by
subdividing densely populated urban areas into electoral districts and
combining sparsely populated rural areas together. Roughly-equalpopulation districts provide each voter with an equal degree of functional
representation and each legislator with an equal degree of voting power.
In addition, equal-population districts reduce the risk of minority vote
dilution. Indeed, the traditional remedy where at-large elections cause
vote dilution has been to carve the jurisdiction into geographic
subdistricts, each of which would elect just one representative.
Combining weighted voting with equal population districts goes even
further and increases minority representation in two ways. First,
population equality eliminates the risk that electoral minorities will be
submerged within a larger district. Second, fixed district boundaries
eliminates the risk that boundaries will be gerrymandered to reduce
representation for electoral minority groups.
This hybrid weighted-voting format has long been used by Cortland
257
County, a county with distinct rural, suburban and urban areas.
255. Roxbury Taxpayers All. v. Del. Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 886 F. Supp. 242, 244
(N.D.N.Y. 1995).
256. For the current allocation of votes, see Board of Supervisors 2016, DEL. COUNTY,

http://www.co.delaware.ny.us/departments/cob/bos.htm (last visited June 5, 2016).
257. CORTLAND COUNTY CONSOLIDATED PLAN 5 (2002) http://www.cortland-co.org/docume
ntcenter/view/1 188 (describing history of Cortland County and noting that the "County consists
of 19 municipalities, including 15 towns, three villages, and one city," and that most development

is located in and around the city).
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Cortland County's legislative map contains nineteen roughly-equal
legislative districts.2 5 8 At the time of its adoption, the districts ranged in
population from 2,100 to 2,700 residents. 2 59 These roughly-equal districts
were created by subdividing the city of Cortland and three more populous
suburban towns into legislative districts, and by grouping rural towns
with smaller populations together to form legislative districts. 2 6 0 To
satisfy the one-person, one-vote requirement, each district was allocated
a number of votes in proportion to its population. 2 6 1
By combining elements of weighted voting with equal-population
districting, Cortland created an apportionment plan with districts that
corresponded to existing political boundaries, yet were close enough in
size not to raise serious concerns about functional representation,
legislator power or minority representation. In upholding the
constitutionality of Cortland County's plan, the New York court
observed:
It unites the smaller towns possessing similarity of interests
into legislative districts; it divides the two larger towns into
legislative districts. The city's boundary is not pierced. It
creates legislative districts much closer in population than if
weighted voting were used on the basis of existing towns and
city wards in which populations vary from 493 to 7469.262
Cortland County's plan thus maximized the advantages of both equalpopulation and weighted-voting apportionment.
Voters in Cortland continue to approve of this approach. Following
the 2010 census, Cortland County considered several possible
redistricting plans, one of which would have eliminated weighted
voting. 2 6 3 In 2012, the voters passed a referendum to maintain their
hybrid weighted-voting/equal-population system. 2 6 4
Indeed, as this Part demonstrates, hybrid weighted-voting plans
harmonize numerous districting priorities. First, mapping electoral
district boundaries onto political subdivisions preserves representation
for political subunits and prevents gerrymandering. Second, forming
roughly equal-population districts minimizes inequalities in legislative
258. CORTLAND CTY., supra note 75.

259. Slater v. Bd. of Supervisors of Cortland, 330 N.Y.S.2d 947, 948-50 (Sup. Ct. 1972),
aff'd, 346 N.Y.S.2d 185 (App. Div. 1973).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 950.
263. Catherine Wilde, Smaller Legislatureon Tuesday's Ballot, CORTLAND STANDARD (NOV.
1, 2012), http://www.cortlandstandard.net/articles/11012012n.htmi (noting the legislators did not

endorse eliminating weighted voting by cutting down the number of representatives to thirteen
because it was "too drastic and would never pass").
264. See CORTLAND COUNTY, N.Y., RULES OF ORDER art. XI (2014).
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representation and prevents minority vote dilution. Finally, using
weighted voting produces the precise numeric equality required to satisfy
the constitutional one-person, one-vote requirement.
CONCLUSION

The constitutional one-person, one-vote doctrine requires that
legislatures be apportioned on a population basis. Most jurisdictions
comply by electing representatives from single-member, equalpopulation districts. While these districts equalize the mathematical
weight of each vote, they sacrifice other legitimate districting priorities.
Instead, this Article proposes a hybrid weighted-voting format that
satisfies the quantitative one-person, one-vote requirement while
preserving representation for political units and preventing
gerrymandering.

